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REPUBLICAN VISION
John Braithwaite*
Jennifer Brown and Linda Wolf do a wonderfully incisive job of drawing
out the promise of restorative attorney discipline.1 In this Comment, I focus
more on the paradoxes described in their essay. I redefine their three main
paradoxes inherent in attorney discipline as the paradox of impunity, the para-
dox of injustice, and the paradox of consumerism:
• The paradox of impunity is that punitive attorney discipline produces
widespread impunity.
• The paradox of injustice is that consumers receive less justice when
they suffer injustice at the hands of justice practitioners than when they
suffer injustice at the hands of providers of non-justice goods and
services.
• The paradox of consumerism is that if victims of justice system injus-
tice are treated as consumers, they will suffer more injustice.
Like Brown and Wolf, I agree that applying restorative justice to attorney
discipline can help dissolve these paradoxes.
THE PARADOX OF IMPUNITY
My tweak of the Brown and Wolf argument on impunity is that punitive
attorney discipline produces widespread impunity. The many reasons for this
are nicely explained in their essay.2 Brown and Wolf show that the conse-
quence of punitive attorney discipline is that stakes become high for lawyers
who are elite professionals with much to lose. Consequently, they dig in. A
politics of denial can become endemic. Denial seems attractive because lawyers
are professionals at denial, while complainants are amateurs. Lawyers contest
complaints on their turf through a tournament of lawyers, and lawyers more
often have more resources to fight than individual victims of bad lawyering.
Under these circumstances, denial and dismissal in which nothing is conceded
to the aggrieved complainant becomes the norm. This is one explanation for the
pattern Brown and Wolf show of 117,598 complaints to disciplinary agencies
(many against multiple lawyers) in 2007 resulting in only 4,782 lawyers being
charged with disciplinary violations.3 Victims of unethical lawyering learn to
* My thanks to Christine Parker for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of
Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253 (2012).
2 Id. at 259 (“When misconduct does not arise from deliberate or calculated wrongdoing, a
system modeled on criminal justice and its requirement of mens rea may simply be barking
up the wrong tree.”).
3 Id. at 258.
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lump it because they have an intuitive grasp of the fact that their odds of suc-
cess with an adversarial complaint are low, and because they shy away from
challenging lawyers on their own turf. Consequently, the statistics radically
understate the impunity that unethical lawyers secure.
Because success at getting behind lawyers’ shields of denial is statistically
rare, findings against lawyers are often professionally devastating, even fatal.
Prevailing victims want blood when they win because these complainants have
won against a legal culture of denial and victim-blaming. Also, the moral
guardians of the profession feel then they must give them some blood in order
to defend the legitimacy of a profession and a justice system that citizens
widely perceive as protecting its own. As with law enforcement against all
forms of complex, “white-collar” wrongdoing, scapegoating of individuals for
more systemic failures becomes normal when there is an imperative to defuse a
scandal;4 the individualising of punitive justice neglects the systemic reform of
the legal profession and legal procedures that are the priority when restorative
justice seeks to respond to an example of systemic injustice.5 For these reasons,
among others, Brown and Wolf and Garvey6 are right to ponder whether attor-
ney discipline systems are too punitive when they do punish, while being too
soft on the vast numbers of culpable lawyers whose denials deliver impunity.
Both the lawyers singled out for punishments that derail their careers and
the victims who see their lawyers enjoy impunity feel a great sense of injustice.
We do not have a well-functioning justice system when almost every case
leaves someone feeling such a deep sense of injustice. As Brown and Wolf
point out, part of the promise of restorative justice is that overwhelming majori-
ties of victims and offenders, in many studies over ninety percent, feel satisfied
with the justice they obtained.7 How do we encapsulate the paradigm shift that
produces this result? Simply put, because injustice hurts, justice should heal. In
the typical client-lawyer conflict, there are feelings of injustice on both sides.
Maybe a lawyer has cut some corners and this is a source of client grievance.
Perhaps the lawyer believes this corner-cutting was what the client demanded
in the past, so it is vexatious for the client now to soil the lawyer’s reputation.
In such a case, apology for the corner-cutting, making good the losses the client
suffered as a result, and an apology from the client to the lawyer for any unfair
attacks on the lawyer’s professional reputation are a package likely to produce
a more just outcome—and an outcome perceived as more just by all sides—
than an adversarial declaration of a winner.
A justice that heals requires a different vision of who should be in the
room. A court case assembles people who can inflict maximum damage on the
opposition’s case. A restorative justice conference assembles in a room people
who can offer maximum support to their own side, be it the side of the com-
plainant or the defendant. When a meeting of two communities of care or sup-
port occurs, the prospect for a mutually healing outcome is maximised.
4 See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY
129–67, 181–87 (1993).
5 See Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 274. Again I am grateful to Christine Parker here.
6 See Steven P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 303, 303 (2003).
7 See Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 294.
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Sitting down with complainants, listening to their story in their own
words, owning responsibility for the things that should be owned and offering
something to repair the harm, is not impunity. Nor is it severe punishment.
Restorative justice dissolves the bifurcation of impunity versus severe punish-
ment. Denial is not necessary or wise with a justice system where it is common
for both sides to get something that they think is just and to give something
they think is just (whether the getting and giving is material, such as compensa-
tion, or symbolic, such as acknowledging unfairness). As Brown and Wolf also
imply, restorative justice can be designed to punish denial, such as where there
is only escalation to adjudication of punishment, or to X+1 punishment (where
X is the normal sanction), when there is provable denial of injustice.8 A combi-
nation of such restorative justice settings can end cultures of denial and defeat
this paradox of impunity.
THE PARADOX OF INJUSTICE
The paradox of injustice is that consumers receive less justice when they
suffer injustice at the hands of the justice system than when they suffer injus-
tice at the hands of the providers of non-justice goods and services. Almost all
justice systems have chronic system capacity crises at all levels. Victims wait
too long for compensation and healing. Innocent defendants wait too long to
clear their names. The legal profession bears the burden of climbing mountains
of backlogs to ameliorate system incapacity. If we distract lawyers too much by
requiring them to defend themselves against allegations of abuse as they go
about that business, then we may cause the backlog to grow bigger. While this
is largely true, it is not entirely true, as some complaints against lawyers are for
causing needless delay.9
Because there is a justice system capacity crisis that needs more lawyers to
fix, there is resistance to tying lawyers up with complaints against lawyers’
own injustices. This is compounded by the fact that for the most part lawyers
control justice claims against lawyers while suppliers of other kinds of goods
and services do not ultimately control complaints against themselves. Such
complaints go to consumer protection agencies, generalist ones and specialized
ones, like the Food and Drug Administration.10 Where complaints against law-
yers are received by a state consumer protection agency, their convention
around the world is to pass the complaint on to a disciplinary system in the
hands of legal professionals, and sometimes in the private hands of the profes-
sion itself.
The combination of a justice system capacity crisis (paradoxically driven
by the high costs the legal profession has inscribed on that system) and lawyer
control over claims against lawyers has produced severely rationed access to
justice against lawyers. When lawyers lead generalist consumer protection
agencies that respond to complaints against widget manufacturers, these regula-
tors worry about causing the collapse of the widget industry or making it less
8 See id. at 274.
9 See id. at 260.
10 See, e.g., Report a Problem, U.S. F.D.A, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/ReportaProblem/
default.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
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competitive than foreign widget firms; regulators might be captured or cor-
rupted by the widget industry (just as can happen in regulation of lawyers); but
because the widget-maker supplies widgets and not consumer protection, regu-
lators do not have to ponder whether their consumer protection action may
paradoxically reduce the future supply of consumer protection. Nor is this con-
sumer affairs regulation performed by one member of the same industry against
another. This is why consumers get less justice when they suffer injustice at the
hands of justice professionals than when they suffer injustice at the hands of the
providers of non-justice goods and services. Admittedly, there is also the fact
that it is a simpler matter for a consumer protection agency to advise the con-
sumer to take the defective appliance back to the retailer and say that the
agency had recommended that it would be reasonable to ask for a replacement,
or to ask a tradesperson to come back and install something properly, with the
agency following up with a concerned phone call or letter if the retailer or
tradesperson refuses. Simpler or not, in most parts of the world11 it is not the
standard move in consumer protection for defective lawyering to expect the
lawyer to perform the defective service again without charge.
Structurally driven injustice is not inevitable in the face of powerful actors
who are shown a way that will leave them better off. Even lawyers who see
restorative justice as deprofessionalized justice, which threatens professional
incomes when it is used to tackle the wider system capacity and cost of justice
crises, can nevertheless see restorative justice as a better way of doing attorney
discipline for the same reason that it will have lower cost and greater effective-
ness. But also because restorative attorney discipline might provide a form of
justice which attorneys experience as more satisfying and, as Brown and Wolf
explain, better defends the legitimacy of the profession.
THE PARADOX OF CONSUMERISM
The paradox of consumerism is that if victims of justice system injustice
are treated as consumers, they will suffer more injustice. The consumer protec-
tion model does have its positive side. Many client complaints are about
11 Christine Parker suggests that the Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales
are exceptions where “this is roughly what happens in relation to the consumer complaint
stream of complaints against lawyers . . . . And I don’t see the justice system or the legal
profession in those two states collapsing. And for most issues it is much simpler and easier
to do this than to go through a Restorative Justice process. Or rather the above sort of
process is as much restoration as you need given the scale of the complaint.” See Email from
Christine Parker, Professor, Centre for Regulatory Studies and Law Faculty, Monash Univer-
sity, to author (on file with author); see also Christine Parker, Regulation of the Ethics of
Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness, 25 UNIV. N.S.W. L. J. 676, 676
(2002) (Austl.). See generally, CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS (1999). See also Steve
Mark, Regulating for Professionalism: The New South Wales Approach, Address at the 2010
American Bar Association Annual Meeting and National Conference of Bar Presidents
Workshop 13–15 (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/
vwFiles/Regulating_for_Professionalism_ABA_Conference_August2010.pdf/$file/Regulat-
ing_for_Professionalism_ABA_Conference_August2010.pdf;  John Briton, The System for
Dealing with Complaints: The Commission’s Approach, Address at the BAQ Conference
10–16 (Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0020/106229/system-
for-dealing-with-compliants.pdf.
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alleged neglect, overcharging, delay, and poor communication.12 A consumer
protection model can prompt lawyers who often fail to see clients as consumers
to respond with more of a consumer service orientation.13 Brown and Wolf
have a critical and insightful section on the consumer protection model of attor-
ney discipline.14 They examine the risks of replacing punishment with a payout
mentality whereby compensation to victims of professionally unethical conduct
might become another cost of doing business for wealthy lawyers.15 When they
discuss consumer culpability as an injustice, they also touch on the problem of
the consumerism model: not all victims of injustice are consumers. Probably
most of the victims of injustices perpetrated by lawyers are not consumers who
have purchased the services of that lawyer. Here is the only place I advance a
slight criticism of emphasis in the Brown and Wolf contribution. While they
outline these critiques of the consumer protection model, and while they
recognise that a “fellow attorney . . . or a third party” can be a complainant,16
their analysis still remains excessively focused on interactions between clients
and attorneys.
The need may be to separate out two different kinds of problems: one is a
lack of basic consumer service among lawyers and the corresponding weakness
in the consumer redress ethos and mechanisms; the other is a want of creative
ways to respond to more serious ethical misdemeanours by lawyers. For outsid-
ers, the most ethically disturbing forms of lawyer misconduct—and the ones
least disciplined—occur where lawyers are unethical for the benefit of corpo-
rate clients who therefore do not complain, such as tobacco, pharmaceutical,
and asbestos industry attorneys destroying requested documents about the
adverse health impacts of their clients’ products.17
There are many reasons why most victims of attorney injustice are not
clients. In matters that go to trial there tend to be more witnesses than clients.
Witnesses are often treated unethically and with appalling injustice. Lawyers
and their clients often have financial and other interests in the case and wit-
nesses usually do not. Very often witnesses, without being compelled, turn up
to testify simply because they think it is the right thing to do—an obligation of
citizenship to be a servant of justice. While lawyers inside the courtroom are
stuffing money in their pockets, the taxi driver they keep endlessly waiting
outside has money leaking from her pocket, as she endures a failure to cover
the costs of her taxi licence. Then when she does enter the courtroom, still
ready to be the good citizen, counsel or the judge, or both, in effect call her a
liar. There, accusations about her past that are untrue are bandied about the
court—accusations that she believes any decent person would treat as private
even if they were true. If this injustice makes her angry and she calls the judge
a liar at the end of her testimony she may be punished for contempt or manhan-
dled out of the courtroom. Citizens should have access to restorative justice to
confront prosecutors, opposing counsel, and judges who are rude to them, who
12 See Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 260.
13 My thanks to Christine Parker for suggesting this qualification to my earlier draft.
14 See Brown & Wolf, supra note 1, at 267–69.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 253.
17 My thanks again to Christine Parker for this observation.
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sleep during their testimony, who order excessive force to manage allegations
of disorderly conduct during trials, or who scandalize them in ways that would
be libel were they to occur outside a courtroom.
In jury trials there are also usually more jurors than clients. There has been
some recent controversy in Australia about officers of courts failing to protect
the anonymity of jurors in ways that make jurors vulnerable to the protagonists,
with jurors having few remedial measures available to them should that happen
as a consequence of their service.18
Perhaps more controversially, citizens should have access to a restorative
justice conference when they can prove that they have served years in prison
for a crime they did not commit, or when their son was executed for a crime he
did not commit, or have a non-vexatious grievance that a prosecutor’s or
judge’s conduct contributed to their fate. That should be a structured opportu-
nity, mandated as a matter of legal professional ethics and judicial ethics, where
those who suffered the injustice have an opportunity to confront the judge or
the prosecutor with their view of why the officer of the court behaved unprofes-
sionally or unjustly. Current structures of justice put excessively kingly powers
in the hands of judges (such as the law of contempt which, according to a
republican theory of justice should not be a criminal offence but a matter of
regulatory enforcement)19 and puts insufficient tools in the hands of citizens
who are dominated by lawyers during trials.
At this point in US history, there is a special need for restorative justice.
The integrity of US justice has eroded in some major ways during the past
decade, especially in the military justice system. If the US is to re-establish the
international reputation it once had as a pre-eminent rights-respecting democ-
racy, it has to look Guantanamo Bay in the eye. A shrug of the shoulders, and a
“that’s democracy” comment are not good enough when even a President
elected on a platform of shutting down an institution designed to corrupt the
spirit of the US Constitution is not allowed by the political system to deliver on
that commitment.20 That is not democracy. No community of citizens can be a
democracy when it settles for such a result. We know now that Guantanamo
Bay is not quite as bad as other prisons in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other coun-
tries, effectively run by the US government, where torture has been widespread
for non-combatant civilians from many countries, including citizens of coun-
tries such as the UK and Australia that have been front-line US allies in its wars
on terror.21 We now know much about the people who have been confined
without trial during the past decade in Guantanamo Bay and other off-shore
18 Louis Andrews, Visiting Judge Raises Jury Concerns, CANBERRA TIMES, July 4, 2011
(Austl.), available at http://www.canberratimes.com.au/news/local/news/general/visiting-
judge-raises-jury-concerns/2214640.aspx.
19 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 94–95 (1990).
20 Chris McGreal, Barack Obama Abandons Guanta´namo Closure Plan After Congress
Veto, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2011, 13:21 PM EST) (U.K.), available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/20/barack-obama-guantanamo-congress-veto.
21 See generally AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 293–316
(2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: DECEPTION, CRUELTY AND THE COMPROMISE OF
LAW (2008).
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War-On-Terror prisons, or endured military trials.22 Some were murderous and
dangerous people. Others were decent folk, often simple ones, who had com-
mitted no crime, or were even members of the Taliban who had tried to work
with the US to prevent the terrorism and the resultant war that left all sides in
pain and despair.23 Thankfully, today such people are at least in dialogue with
those in Afghanistan backed by western powers. At the same time, some of the
US military lawyers involved in Guantanamo Bay cases were inspiring interna-
tional emissaries for US Constitutional values.24 Their tenacity on behalf of a
rights culture as an alternative to a culture of legal denial offers a clue to how
the judicial branch and the legal profession might struggle to restore republican
democracy to the US when the executive and legislative branches cannot or
will not.25 The US legal profession could show a new kind of international
leadership in access to justice by granting a right to a restorative justice confer-
ence for people who can prove that they were held for years without trial, or
after an unjust trial when they had committed no crime.
Is there a way for innovators of the US legal profession to push for making
lawyers vulnerable to the injustice complaints of incarcerated innocents as a
matter of basic professional ethics for a lawyer (in this case a lawyer serving in
the military justice system)? Here is where the inspiring ethical leadership of
some of the US military lawyers captures the imagination. A restorative justice
forum would give them a better opportunity than they currently have, along
with the victims of War-On-Terror injustice, to prick the conscience of the US
justice system, to mobilise both domestic and international publics to put pres-
sure on the Obama Administration and Congress to restore nobility to the jus-
tice of the US Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Restorative justice is not simply about better processes that work more
effectively in delivering justice for victims, improving the ethics of the legal
profession, and the like. It is much more opinionated than mediation about
justice values and the values of republican democracies. Restorative justice has
22 Some have written biographies. See e.g., Abdul Salam Zaeef, MY LIFE WITH THE
TALIBAN (2010); DAVID HICKS, GUANTANAMO: MY JOURNEY (2010) (Austl.); MAMDOUH
HABIB WITH JULIA COLLINGWOOD, MY STORY: THE TALE OF A TERRORIST WHO WASN’T
(2008).
23 John Braithwaite, Conclusion: Hope and Humility for Weavers with International Law,
in THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REBUILDING SOCIETIES AFTER CONFLICT: GREAT
EXPECTATIONS, at 270–89 (Brett Bowden, Hilary Charlesworth & Jeremy Farrall eds. 2009),
(referring to the attempts of the former Taliban Foreign Minister to warn the U.S. about Al
Qaeda in 2001 and negotiate independent legal proceedings); see also ZAEEF, supra note 22,
at 101–22 (biography of the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan in 2001).
24 See Leonard Doyle, Guantanamo Military Lawyer Breaks Ranks to Condemn ‘Uncon-
scionable’ Detention, THE INDEP. (Oct. 27, 2007) (U.K.), available at http://www.indepen-
dent.co.uk/news/world/americas/guantanamo-military-lawyer-breaks-ranks-to-condemn-
unconscionable-detention-398033.html; see also Neil A. Lewis, Military lawyers prepare to
speak on Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/11/
washington/11jags.html.
25 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010).
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a vision for deepening the furrows of republican democracy. Many of the
important elements of that vision are well captured in the Brown and Wolf
essay. While the social movement for restorative justice has much in common
with the social movement for a more deliberative democracy—a shared vision
of institutionalizing a deeper valorization of citizen voice—restorative justice
differs from it in seeing the judicial branch as the front-line of struggles to
deepen democracy, rather than the legislative branch. Or perhaps the education
system (restorative justice for citizens to learn to be democratic in schools, in
confronting problems like bullying)26 is an even more important front-line for
this generation. Transforming educational institutions with the wisdom of
Brown and Wolf might hold hope that our grandchildren will lead democracy
to a world without Guantanamo Bays, or even the wars that make some think
they are necessary.
26 BRENDA MORRISON, RESTORATING SAFE SCHOOL COMMUNITIES: A WHOLE SCHOOL
RESPONSE TO BULLYING, VIOLENCE AND ALIENATION 73–95 (2007).
